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Abstract
In a reasonably calibrated Mortensen and Pissarides matching model, shocks to average
labor productivity can account for only a small portion of the ￿ uctuations in unemployment
and vacancies (Shimer (2005a)). In this paper, I argue that if vintage speci￿c shocks rather
than aggregate productivity shocks are the driving force of ￿ uctuations, the model does a better
job of accounting for the data. I add heterogeneity in jobs (matches) with respect to the time
the job is created in the form of di⁄erent embodied technology levels. I also introduce speci￿c
capital that, once adapted for a match, has less value in another match. In the quantitative
analysis, I show that shocks to di⁄erent vintages of entrants are able to account for ￿ uctuations
in unemployment and vacancies and that, in this environment, speci￿c capital is important to
decreasing the volatility of the destruction rate of existing matches.
JEL Classi￿cation: E24, E32, J41, J63, J64
Keywords: Search, Matching, Business Cycles, Labor Markets
1 Introduction
The Mortensen and Pissarides (MP) matching model has become the dominant framework for
studying a variety of labor market issues. Despite its widespread use, the MP model encounters
problems in accounting for the cyclical properties of its two key variables, unemployment and
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1vacancies. In most papers, aggregate labor productivity shocks have been used as the source
of ￿ uctuations in these variables, which has resulted in two major problems. One problem, as
argued by Shimer (2005), is that when the model is reasonably calibrated, shocks to aggregate
productivity can account for only a small portion of the volatilities in unemployment and vacancies.
The second problem is that an MP model with only aggregate productivity shocks generates a very
high correlation between vacancies per unemployed worker and average labor productivity, while
in the data the correlation is much smaller (close to zero for the period 1986-2005).
In this paper, I show that the addition of speci￿c capital, which has less value in another match
once it is already employed in a match, and shocks to the embodied technology of matches that a⁄ect
only entrants in any given period successfully resolve both problems. In the model, a production
unit (a match) is composed of a ￿rm, a worker, and the capital employed in the match. Every match
embodies a technology level determined at the time of its creation. This is a plausible representation
if investment opportunities available at the time of creation of any match a⁄ect the technology of
the match permanently. In this setting, part of economic growth is driven by the replacement of
old, low-productivity jobs with new high-productivity ones.1 The embodied technology framework
is consistent with the micro-level evidence that ￿rm level productivity is highly persistent and that
around half of aggregate productivity growth happens through reallocation of workers across ￿rms.2
More important, shocks to new vintages are now a signi￿cant source of ￿ uctuations.
The inclusion of shocks to the embodied technology of entrants solves the problem related
to volatilities because these shocks have a large impact on vacancy postings (and thus on the
unemployment rate) and a small impact on average labor productivity, both of which are consistent
with the data. A shock to the embodied technology of new entrants a⁄ects the productivity of new
entrants permanently, while the e⁄ects of an aggregate shock (calibrated to aggregate productivity
data) is persistent but not permanent. This implies that shocks to embodied technology have a
bigger impact on pro￿ts for entrants and so on vacancy postings. In addition, because these shocks
a⁄ect only new entrants and leave the productivity of existing matches unchanged, their e⁄ect on
average labor productivity is negligible.
The second important element in the model, speci￿c capital, improves the performance of the
model because it controls the rate of destruction of existing matches. This feature is important to
matching the strong negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment, also known as the
1This structure does not exclude the possibility of growth in the productivity of existing matches. It is reasonable
to think that some technological upgrades might necessitate a new match, while some others can be adopted within
an existing match. In the quantitative analysis I will assume that only a portion of the growth in the macroeconomy
happens through the replacement process.
2Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998) show that there is a large degree of persistence in productivity ranking and
that a signi￿cant part of the economy￿ s productivity growth accrues by means of resource reallocation. Foster et al.
(2001) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000) provide an extensive review of the existing literature on the topic.
2Beveridge curve. The model with only aggregate shocks gets this correlation right.3 In the existing
literature, there is concern that a model with sector-speci￿c shocks that a⁄ect only a portion of
the economy (such as shocks to only the new vintage, as in this paper) would be unable to match
this relationship.4 A positive shock to the new vintage results in an increase in the pro￿ts of
entrants and in vacancy postings. At the same time, existing low-productivity matches might be
terminated, so that workers look for employment within the new vintage; and at the macro level
vacancies and unemployment might increase together (weakening the negative correlation between
unemployment and vacancies). In this model, this problem does not arise and the strong negative
correlation between vacancies and unemployment is preserved because the speci￿c capital of the
match makes existing matches more valuable relative to new ones. In the face of a positive shock
to new matches, mass destruction of existing matches does not occur as that would result in a loss
of valuable match-speci￿c capital.
To examine whether the model can account for the data quantitatively, I determine the shock
processes by minimizing the distance between the business cycle frequency moments in the data
and the moments generated by the model. In the estimations, I ￿nd that the volatility of vintage-
speci￿c shocks is close to the volatility of aggregate shocks. The combination of aggregate and
vintage-speci￿c shocks can account for the volatilities in unemployment, vacancies, and average
labor productivity. I also ￿nd low correlation between aggregate shocks and vintage-speci￿c shocks,
which suggests the importance of distinguishing between shocks that a⁄ect only the new investments
and shocks that a⁄ect the overall economy. In addition, I show that speci￿c capital is important
to keep the correlation between vacancies and unemployment strongly negative as in the data.
Most of the papers that responded to Shimer￿ s (2005a) criticism of the benchmark model con-
tinue to rely on aggregate productivity shocks. Farmer (2004), Shimer (2004), and Hall (2005)
propose rigid wages as a solution to the volatility puzzle. In the standard model where wages are
determined through Nash bargaining, wages comove strongly with the productivity shock, prevent-
ing a strong response in pro￿ts. Rigid wages set close to output allow pro￿ts to respond more
strongly to aggregate productivity shocks. Although the assumption of rigid wages is consistent
with low cyclicality of aggregate wages in the data, Pissarides (2007) and Haefke et. al. (2007)
show for the US economy that wages in new jobs respond strongly to market conditions; and in
the model the strong response of pro￿ts (and vacancies) requires low cyclicality of wages in the
newly created jobs.5 Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007) calibrate the model to match the elasticity
3A positive aggregate shock to the economy increases the pro￿ts of ￿rms and the vacancy postings. Increased va-
cancy postings result in higher job-￿nding rates, decreasing unemployment. As a result, vacancies and unemployment
move in opposite directions in response to aggregate productivity shocks.
4See Abraham and Katz (1986) and Blanchard and Diamond (1989).
5Rigidity of wages in continuing matches has no impact on pro￿ts and vacancies if wages in continuing matches
are set at a ￿xed level determined through Nash bargaining at the ￿rst period of the match. Rudanko (2006) has
3of aggregate wages in the data, but as discussed above the relevant parameter to match should be
the response of wages in new jobs, not aggregate wages.
This paper is also related to the literature of embodied (vintage) technology framework. One of
the earliest papers that looked at job creation and destruction in a vintage framework is Caballero
and Hammour (1994) in which they analyze how job creation and separation responds to demand
shocks. My model endogenizes the creation frictions by embedding the vintage framework in
a matching environment. Gilchrist and Williams (2000) analyze a putty-clay technology (where
productivity is embodied in the capital unit installed, and the capital labor ratio is irreversible) and
show that the addition of embodied technology shocks signi￿cantly improves the performance of
the RBC model. More recent papers, such as Costain and Reiter (2005) and Michelacci and Lopez-
Salido (2007), embed a vintage framework into a model with matching frictions in the labor market.
Costain and Reiter (2005) show that embodied technology shocks have more amplifying power than
aggregate shocks. However, their analysis lacks some key features of my model, such as allowing
for endogenous destruction of matches and match-speci￿c capital; without these elements they are
unable to ￿t the data. Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007) look at a setting with a single household
in which consumption and work are shared equally among workers (similar to Andolfatto (1996)
and den Haan et al. (2000)), and their focus is on the di⁄erent impulse responses of employment
to embodied and disembodied technology shocks. Hornstein et al.(2007) look at a setting where all
vintages have identical capital intensity (and embodied productivity), but vintages incur di⁄erent
costs of capital, depending on investment-speci￿c technology shocks at the time of creation of the
job.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the model environment for the
stationary economy and derive the equilibrium conditions. Section 3 does the same for the growth
economy. Section 4 presents the calibration and estimation of the parameters and displays the
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Stationary Economy
2.1 Model
The model is a stochastic discrete time version of the Mortensen-Pissarides matching model (Pis-
sarides (1985), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)). I add embodied technology shocks and speci￿c
capital. First, the stationary version of the model is introduced because of its simplicity. In the
following section, growth in vintages is incorporated into the model.
a slightly di⁄erent setting where workers are risk averse and ￿rms are risk-neutral, and the optimal contract results
in wages that are less responsive to productivity shocks in the continuing matches. Both settings imply less cyclical
wages at the aggregate level, while the response of wages in new matches is strongly procyclical.
42.1.1 Workers, Firms, and Capital
There is a measure one of in￿nitely lived workers maximizing their lifetime utility. Workers are
risk-neutral and have a discount rate of ￿:
At any point in time, a worker is either working or is unemployed and looking for a job.
Employed workers cannot search for jobs. When the worker is unemployed, he receives an income
equivalent utility ￿ ow of b > 0.
Firms are also risk-neutral with the same discount factor as workers and there is an in￿nite
supply of them.
A production unit is composed of a ￿rm, a worker, and K units of capital. The rental rate of
capital is assumed to be ￿xed and is equal to r in each period.
The production of a match depends on both the period aggregate shock At that a⁄ects all
matches in the same way and the embodied technology of the match z, which is ￿xed for the
lifetime of the match. The time t output of a match with speci￿c productivity z is equal to:
Atz if K ￿ K
0 else
To produce positive output, K units of capital need to be employed inelastically in the match.
The distribution of speci￿c shocks for new entrants depends on the investment opportunities
available at the time of the entry, which are summarized by the state variable Zt. In each period,
match-speci￿c shocks for new entrants are drawn according to some probability distribution func-
tion H (zjZt): The couplet of shocks (At;Zt) follows a ￿rst order Markov process according to a
bivariate probability distribution G(At+1;Zt+1jAt;Zt): This speci￿cation allows the two shocks to
be correlated with each other.
To model speci￿c capital, I assume that once capital is employed in a match, it becomes partially
match speci￿c. When the match is dissolved and the match capital is employed for another job, a
proportion ￿ 2 (0;1) of its value depreciates.
I assume that capital is rented from a risk-neutral intermediary at the rental rate r = 1=￿ ￿ 1:
If the match ends, the intermediary is compensated for the loss of value in capital by the worker
and the ￿rm. The worker pays a proportion ￿ 2 (0;1) of the loss in value and the ￿rm pays for the
remaining portion (1 ￿ ￿):
Given the above contract, the ￿ ow cost of capital to the match is equal to:
CK = rK (1)
where K is the capital that is inelastically needed for production. How the ￿ ow cost of capital is
shared between the worker and the ￿rm does not a⁄ect the results, so I assume without loss of
generality that CK is paid by the ￿rm.




; 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 (2)
CE is the discounted value of the loss in capital. If the match ends, the worker pays ￿CE and the
￿rm pays (1 ￿ ￿)CE to the intermediary.
2.1.2 The Labor Market
There are frictions in the labor market such that ￿rms and workers do not meet immediately. A
￿rm needs to post a vacancy at a ￿xed cost CV per period to meet with a worker. In addition,
posting a vacancy does not ensure a meeting. The total number of meetings in each period follows
the function m(ut;vt); where ut denotes the unemployment rate and vt denotes the number of
vacancies posted in that period. The function m(ut;vt) is assumed to be concave in each argument
and constant returns to scale in both arguments.
￿t = vt=ut denotes the market tightness at time t. Because the meeting function is constant
returns to scale, the probability of a ￿rm meeting a worker after posting a vacancy and the prob-
ability of an unemployed worker meeting a ￿rm both depend only on market tightness ￿t and not
on vacancies or unemployment separately.










Since there are match-speci￿c shocks, every meeting does not necessarily turn into employment.
For a meeting to turn into employment, both the ￿rm and the worker need to agree about it. Let ￿t
denote the set of match-speci￿c productivity draws z for which a meeting turns into employment.
Speci￿c shocks may also lead to the endogenous termination of matches. The set ￿t denotes
those speci￿c shocks z for which both the ￿rm and the worker prefer to continue with employment.
In addition to endogenous termination of employment, workers and ￿rms separate exogenously with
probability ￿ each period. In the period in which the match is formed, the probability of exogenous
termination is zero.
2.1.3 Determination of Wages
Wages are determined according to a Nash bargaining game between the worker and the ￿rm over
the total surplus of the match and are renegotiated each period. The bargaining power of the
6worker is ￿ 2 [0;1] and that of the ￿rm is 1 ￿ ￿.6
Another assumption used is that the termination cost CE is shared in the same proportion
to the bargaining weight of each party, that is, ￿ = ￿. A motivation for the assumption is that
whoever is getting more of the surplus will have more incentive to undertake the cost of termination
as the surplus of the match becomes negative.7
The formulation that wages are renegotiated in each period of an existing match might seem
unrealistic given that in the quantitative analysis the time period is taken to be a week. As referred
to in Shimer (2005a), because agents are risk-neutral, the analysis does not necessarily pin down
the timing of wage payments. The surplus is not a⁄ected by the frequency of wage-negotiation
and the analysis below holds as long as the worker gets the value determined by Nash bargaining
at the start of the match. Wages can be paid in any manner following employment as long as a
commitment technology on promises exist.
2.2 Characterization of Recursive Equilibrium
I look for an equilibrium where the market tightness ￿ depends only on aggregate state variables
(A;Z).
The following section expresses the equilibrium equations for the wage contract that depend on
embodied productivity z of the match and aggregate state variables (A;Z): Section 2.2.1 speci￿es
wages under Nash bargaining. Section 2.2.2 simpli￿es the equilibrium equations using the Nash
bargaining wages speci￿ed in Section 2.2.1.
The value of the match to the ￿rm is:
￿ (A;Z;z) =
zA ￿ CK ￿ w(A;Z;z) ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)CE
+￿ (1 ￿ ￿)E
￿
1fz2￿(A0;Z0)g￿ (A0;Z0;z) ￿ 1fz= 2￿(A0;Z0)g(1 ￿ ￿)CE
￿ (3)
where 1[:] is the indicator function, which takes a value of 1 if the statement inside is true; otherwise,
it takes a value of zero. All expectations in the paper are conditioned on current values of (A;Z).
w(A;Z;z) is the ￿ ow wage rate. Period pro￿t is output less the wage and the ￿ ow cost of capital.
In the next period, the decision to terminate or continue with the match happens after all agents
observe the aggregate productivity shocks (A0;Z0): If z = 2 ￿(A0;Z0) or if there is an exogenous
termination (which happens with probability ￿) the match ends and the cost to the ￿rm is (1￿￿)CE;
otherwise the match continues. Match speci￿c productivity z stays the same next period, so the
expectation of pro￿ts is taken only over the possible aggregate states of next period.
6In the period that the ￿rm and the worker meet, if they decide to turn the match into employment, it is assumed
that the wage negotiation happens after capital is employed. As a result, wages are determined in the same manner
in each period regardless of whether it is the ￿rst or a subsequent period.
7There is an equilibrium even without this assumption. The condition just ensures that employment is undertaken
and terminated whenever it is e¢ cient to do so.
7Let ￿￿ (A;Z) denote the set of match-speci￿c productivities for which the ￿rm is willing to
continue with employment and let ￿￿ (A;Z) be the set of match-speci￿c productivities for which
it is willing to turn a meeting into employment. The sets are determined by:
￿￿ (A;Z) = fz : ￿(A;Z;z) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)CEg (4)
￿￿ (A;Z) = fz : ￿(A;Z;z) ￿ 0g (5)
Once capital has been adopted for a match, the cost of terminating the match for the ￿rm is
(1￿￿)CE. The ￿rm is willing to continue with employment unless its value drops below ￿(1￿￿)CE:
If capital is not yet employed, the outside value to the ￿rm of rejecting the match is 0.
The value of the match to the worker is:

















where U(A;Z) is the value of unemployment in aggregate state (A;Z). The ￿ ow value to the
worker is the period wage rate. In the following period, if the match is not subject to an exogenous
termination shock and z 2 ￿(A0;Z0) the worker receives next period￿ s value of employment in the
same match. Otherwise, he receives his outside option, which is unemployment utility minus the
cost of termination of the match ￿CE.
The value of unemployment is:
















When the worker is unemployed he gets the ￿ ow utility of b. With probability f (￿(A;Z)) he gets
a meeting with an employer next period, which turns into employment if z0 2 ￿(A0;Z0); otherwise,
he gets unemployment utility in the next period as well. If a match does occur, the worker gets the
employment value of the match W (A0;Z0;z0).
Similar to the ￿rm￿ s case, ￿w (A;Z) denotes the set of match-speci￿c productivities for which
the worker is willing to continue with employment, and ￿w (A;Z) denotes the set of match-speci￿c
productivities for which he is willing to turn a meeting into employment:
￿w (A;Z) = fz : W(A;Z;z) ￿ U(A;Z) ￿ ￿CEg (8)
￿w (A;Z) = fz : W(A;Z;z) ￿ U(A;Z)g (9)
The logic is similar to the one applied to the ￿rm. In an already existing match, the worker￿ s
outside opportunity is the unemployment value minus the cost of terminating the match to the
8worker, ￿CE: For a new meeting to be accepted, the expected value within the match needs to be
higher than his outside value of unemployment.
The sets ￿(A;Z) and ￿(A;Z) can be found by:
￿(A;Z) = ￿w (A;Z) \ ￿￿ (A;Z)
￿(A;Z) = ￿w (A;Z) \ ￿￿ (A;Z)
The above condition is a result of the assumption that for employment to continue or for a meeting
to turn into employment, it should be acceptable to both parties.
As there is free entry to posting vacancies, the expected value to posting a vacancy is equal to







The ￿rm pays the cost of posting a vacancy in the current period and meets with a worker next
period with probability q (￿(A;Z)), which turns into a match only if z0 2 ￿(A0;Z0).
Let ￿(z) denote the mass of matches with productivity shock z. ￿0 (z) and u0 denote, respec-
tively, the mass of people with productivity shock z and the mass of unemployed people in the
following period. The law of motion for the unemployment rate u is:





dz0 + ￿ (1 ￿ u) + (1 ￿ ￿)
Z
1fz= 2￿(A0;Z0)g￿(z)dz
The right-hand side of the above equation can be understood as the result of three types of ￿ ows.
Of the workers unemployed, uf (￿(A;Z)) of them gets a meeting with a ￿rm, and if the draw of the
meeting z0 is an element of ￿(A0;Z0) the worker exits the unemployment pool. A fraction ￿ of em-
ployed workers￿employment ends exogenously. The ￿nal term is the addition to the unemployment
pool of the workers whose employment is endogenously terminated.
The law of motion for ￿(z) is:
￿0 (z) = 1fz2￿(A0;Z0)g
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿(z) + 1fz2￿(A0;Z0)guf (￿(A;Z))H
￿
zjZ0￿￿
If z = 2 ￿(A0;Z0) then the mass of matches with productivity z is zero, as all such matches are
endogenously terminated. If z 2 ￿(A0;Z0), (1 ￿ ￿) of existing matches of productivity z continues
with employment, and if z 2 ￿(A0;Z0), a mass of uf (￿(A;Z))H (zjZ0) new matches of productivity
z are created:







9The mass of ￿rms ￿(z) is multiplied by their speci￿c productivity and the weighted sum is divided
by the total mass of ￿rms.
In the next section I specify the wage rate determination in Nash bargaining to solve for the
equilibrium.
2.2.1 Determination of wages (Nash Bargaining)
The surplus of an activated match is:
S(A;Z;z) = ￿(A;Z;z) + W(A;Z;z) ￿ U(A;Z) + CE (11)
The term CE comes from the fact that the match-speci￿c part of capital has a value only as long
as the match continues. According to Nash bargaining, the wages and pro￿ts are determined as:
￿(A;Z;z) = (1 ￿ ￿)S(A;Z;z) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)CE (12)
W(A;Z;z) = ￿S(A;Z;z) + U(A;Z) ￿ ￿CE (13)
The ￿rm gets a share (1 ￿ ￿) of the surplus above its outside value of ￿(1 ￿ ￿)CE. The worker
gets a proportion ￿ of the surplus above its outside value of U(A;Z) ￿ ￿CE:
2.2.2 Equilibrium Conditions Rewritten with a Nash Bargaining Assumption
In this section, equilibrium conditions are simpli￿ed using the surplus allocation rules speci￿ed in
the previous section. The main aim is to obtain a simpli￿ed version of the surplus equation.
Using the wage setting rule of Nash bargaining, equation (4), and the assumption that ￿ = ￿;
it is seen that the ￿rm is willing to continue employment whenever the surplus of the match is
positive S ￿ 0: Likewise, the worker is willing to continue employment under the same condition,
S ￿ 0; which is found by using equation (8). As a result, the set ￿(A;Z) is:
￿(A;Z) = fz : S(A;Z;z) ￿ 0g (14)
To specify the set ￿(A;Z), it is notationally more convenient to de￿ne the surplus of a meeting
in the ￿rst period before capital is activated. I denote this as SB:
SB(A;Z;z) = S(A;Z;z) ￿ CE (15)
The di⁄erence between SB and S is that, as capital is not yet activated, CE is not part of the
surplus. Using the wage setting rule of Nash bargaining, equation (5) and the assumption that
￿ = ￿ , it is found that the ￿rm is willing to turn the meeting into employment whenever the
surplus of the meeting (before capital is employed) is positive SB ￿ 0: Likewise, using equation (9)
10the worker is also willing to turn the meeting into employment whenever SB ￿ 0: Following these,
the set ￿(A;Z) is:
￿(A;Z) = fz : SB(A;Z;z) ￿ 0g (16)
Because ￿ = ￿, using equations (12) and (15), I get ￿ = ￿SB. Substituting this and equation
(18) into equation (10), the free-entry condition becomes:








The derivation of the surplus expression below is given in Appendix 1.
S(A;Z;z) =
zA ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)CK ￿ b ￿
￿(A;Z)￿CV
(1￿￿)
+￿ (1 ￿ ￿)E maxfS (A0;Z0;z);0g
(18)
The surplus equation is quite intuitive. The ￿rst term is the period output of the ￿rm. The ￿ ow
cost of capital is subtracted, but the cost of capital is (1 ￿ ￿)CK rather than CK, as the value of
capital is only (1 ￿ ￿)K in other matches. The next two terms are related to the unemployment
utility of the worker that is subtracted from the surplus. The next period￿ s surplus is added only
for the states in which it is above zero.
The equilibrium for ￿(A;Z) can be solved numerically by using equations (17) and (18). The
solution algorithm is given in Appendix 3. In the model, market tightness ￿ (and thus vacancies)
adjust immediately. Once ￿(A;Z) and sets ￿(A;Z) and ￿(A;Z) are solved for, the mass of people
of di⁄erent productivities and unemployment can be simulated using their laws of motion.
3 Growth economy
3.1 Augmented Model
In this section, I add growth to the model economy presented in the preceding section. The growth
in the economy can be driven by either growth in aggregate productivity A or growth in new
vintages. The growth in A, since it does not a⁄ect the relative productivity between matches, does
not change the endogenous mechanisms. In the following section, growth in the productivity of
vintages is considered.
The productivity parameters A; Z and z are stationary in this section also, but there is a trend
growth of 1 + g in the embodied productivity of new meetings. The time t output of a match
created at time ￿ ￿ t; with speci￿c productivity z is equal to:
(
(1 + g)￿zAt if K ￿ K(1 + g)￿
0 else
; ￿ ￿ t
11For a balanced growth path, I require that the minimum capital needed for positive production
grows at the same rate as the trend productivity growth for new cohorts (1 + g), and once the
match is formed, the required capital is ￿xed for that cohort. With this assumption, the ￿ ow cost
of capital of a match formed at time ￿ ￿ t becomes:
CK;￿ = rK (1 + g)
￿ = (1 + g)￿CK; ￿ ￿ t
where CK = rK:
As in the stationary economy, proportion ￿ of employed capital becomes match speci￿c. The





￿ = (1 + g)






For a balanced growth path, it is possible to keep the cost of posting a vacancy CV constant,
and let ￿(A;Z) grow at a constant rate; or keep ￿(A;Z) stationary, and let the cost of posting
a vacancy grow at rate 1 + g. The two assumptions will result in the same dynamics in other
variables. I use the second approach and assume:
CV;t = (1 + g)tCV
For a balanced growth path, the ￿ ow utility of unemployment needs to grow at rate (1 + g) as
well:
bt = (1 + g)tb
The rest of the assumptions are the same as in the stationary economy.
3.2 Characterization of Equilibrium
In this section, only stationary versions of the equilibrium equations are presented. Non-stationary
equilibrium equations for the growth economy are given in Appendix 2. To make the model sta-
tionary, the surplus equation is detrended by (1+g)t. A variable x is denoted as b x in the detrended
economy.
I again look for an equilibrium where the market tightness ￿ depend on the aggregate state
variables (A;Z).
In the stationary economy, the surplus b S and set b ￿, in addition to aggregate and match speci￿c
shocks (A;Z;z), depends on the age of the match, which is the di⁄erence between the current
period and the period in which the match is formed d = t ￿ ￿; ￿ ￿ t.
12The surplus of a match is:
b S(A;Z;z;d) =









b S(A0;Z0;z;d + 1);0
oi (19)
The surplus in the growth economy is very similar to the surplus found in the no-growth economy.
The only di⁄erence is that the output minus the ￿ ow cost of capital that is attached to the vintage






. This comes from the fact that the output zA and the ￿ ow cost of
capital CK of an existing match are shrinking at rate (1 + g) relative to the productivity of the
newest vintage, as the match ages. As the unemployment utility of the worker is increasing relative
to staying in the match as the match gets older, the surplus must become negative as the match
ages.
Again it is of use to de￿ne the surplus of a meeting in the ￿rst period before capital is employed,
b SB(A;Z;z):
b SB(A;Z;z) = b S(A;Z;z;0) ￿ CE
As in the stationary economy, whenever the relevant surpluses are positive, a meeting is turned








z : b SB(A;Z;z) ￿ 0
o
The no pro￿t condition is:







The ￿ ow of motion for the mass of matches with productivity z belonging to cohort d, ￿(z;d),
is:
￿0 (z;d) = 1fz2b ￿(A0;Z0;d)g(1 ￿ ￿)￿(z;d ￿ 1) for d > 0
After a period passes, cohort d ￿ 1, becomes cohort d, since the match ages one more period. If
z = 2 b ￿(A0;Z0;d), then the mass of matches of ￿0 (z;d) becomes zero; otherwise, they are exogenously
terminated at rate ￿.
￿0 (z;0) = 1fz2b ￿(A0;Z0)guf (￿(A;Z))H
￿
zjZ0￿
Cohort d = 0 consists of only new matches. The total mass of new meetings is uf (￿(A;Z)) out of
which H (zjZ0) has productivity z. If z 2 b ￿(A0;Z0), then those meetings turn into employment.
13It is easy to see that:
lim
d!1
￿(z;d) = 0 for 8z; if ￿ > 0 and ￿(z;0) < 1
As cohorts age, in the limit their mass approaches zero as they are exogenously terminated at rate
￿ each period.
The ￿ ow of motion for unemployment u is:





As in the stationary economy, the change in the number of unemployed is composed of new em-
ployments that exit the unemployment pool, plus the exogenously and endogenously terminated
matches.











For the numerator, the mass of ￿rms ￿(z;d) is multiplied by their productivity level z and as
the productivity is expressed relative to the productivity of the newest cohort, it is discounted
according to its age (1 + g)￿d: The weighted sum is divided by the total mass of ￿rms to get the
average productivity.
4 Quantitative Exercise
The summary statistics of unemployment, vacancy postings, labor productivity, and market tight-
ness for the US economy are displayed in Table 1. The table is taken from Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2007). Unemployment and vacancies are 10 times and market tightness is 20 times more volatile
than average labor productivity. In Shimer (2005a), the model-generated volatility of market
tightness is only twice the volatility of labor productivity (in his paper, changes in average labor
productivity are the only driving force of changes in market tightness).
The correlation of unemployment and vacancies is -0.919. This strong negative correlation is
also known as the Beveridge curve in the literature. The correlation between labor productivity
and market tightness is 0.393. As we will see, with only shocks to average labor productivity, the
model generates almost full correlation between these variables. Although this is partially due to
the fact that there is no propagation mechanism in the model, it also suggests that there might be
other sources of ￿ uctuations in market tightness and unemployment.
14The model is solved numerically to evaluate its quantitative implications. Below describes the
speci￿cation of functional forms, choice of parameter values, and evaluation of results.
4.1 Speci￿cation of Functional Forms





This function ensures that the probability of ￿nding a job and of ￿lling a vacancy always lies
between 0 and 1.


















Innovations ("A;t;"Z;t) are serially independent, multivariate normal random variables distrib-
















For simplicity, I assume that all new matches formed at time t have productivity Zt.
4.2 Choice of Parameter Values
Standard parameters are calibrated in line with the preceding literature. The parameters governing
the shock processes are chosen by minimizing the distance between the moments in the data and
the moments of the simulations of the model. For comparative purposes, I perform the same
exercises for an economy with only aggregate shocks. In the economy with only aggregate shocks
match-speci￿c productivities are normalized to one. The ￿rst part describes the calibration of the
parameters, which are displayed in Tables 2-3.
The time period in the model is a week. Weekly discount factor ￿ is chosen as 0:991=12 which
corresponds to a 4% yearly risk-free interest rate.
For the calibration of matching function parameters, I use the estimates in the literature as
described in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007). Shimer (2005a) estimates a monthly job ￿nding rate
f of 0.45 and a separation rate of 0.026 (not adjusted for time aggregation). Den Haan et al. (2000)
estimates a job ￿lling rate q of 0.71, which gives an average value of ￿ = f=q = 0:634. At weekly
frequencies these estimates imply a job ￿nding rate of 0:139 and a job separation rate of 0:0081.
The exogenous separation rate ￿ is chosen such that the average weekly separation rate in the
model (which includes both the endogenous and exogenous separations) is 0:0081. The ￿ ow cost
15of posting a vacancy, CV ; and the matching parameter l are calibrated to ￿t the average market
tightness ￿ = 0:634 and the average job ￿nding rate f = 0:139.
The bargaining weight of the worker ￿ is determined by the Hosios e¢ ciency condition. With a
Cobb-Douglas matching function, the Hosios condition of equating bargaining power to the unem-
ployment elasticity can be satis￿ed everywhere. This is possible for HRW￿ s matching function only
on average because the elasticity is not constant. I set ￿ equal to the steady state unemployment
elasticity of the matching function, 1=(1 + ￿￿l).
The ￿ ow utility of unemployment b is chosen to be 0.45 which is 70 % of net labor income.8
This value of ￿ ow unemployment utility is above Shimer￿ s (2005a) 40% (of labor income)and below
Hagedorn and Manovskii￿ s (2007) 95.5% (of labor income).
The total capital cost consists of the ￿ ow cost of capital CK and the loss of value in capital
when it is employed in another match CE. The ￿ ow cost of capital CK is calibrated to match a
capital share of 35%. The calibrated CK is 0:27 and 0:22 for the no-growth and growth economies
respectively. The di⁄erence arises from the fact that the cost of exit CE used is higher in the growth
economy and to keep total capital cost ￿xed at 35% CK is decreased to 0.22 in the growth economy.
Increasing CE without a corresponding decrease in CK increases the volatilities of unemployment
and vacancies on its own.9 In that respect, quantifying CE as part of the physical capital cost
works against me when trying to explain the volatilities of unemployment and vacancies.
For the growth economy, I assume that embodied technology grows at rate of 1% per year,
which would imply that the rest of the growth in labor productivity comes from growth in aggregate
productivity A.




and the cost of terminating a
match CE; I minimize the distance between the business cycle moments of the data and model-
generated simulations. The key business cycle moments matched are as in Table 1.
The following procedure is used to minimize the distance between the moments of the data














are solved for. (The computational methods used for the
stationary and growth economies are explained in Appendix 3.) Using the solution of the model
8Net labor income refers to wage income minus the portion of the cost of exit paid by the worker (a portion ￿ of
cost of exit CE is paid by the worker).
9Increasing CE (without a corresponding decrease in CK) increases the volatilities of unemployment and vacancies.
The mechanism works in the same way as increasing the ￿ ow cost of capital CK or increasing the ￿ ow utility of
unemployment b. Lowering the portion of output that is shared between the worker and the ￿rm (which is equal
to output minus the ￿ ow unemployment utility of the worker and all other costs that are paid to third parties for
production) increases the volatility of market tightness. In that respect, increasing CE, CK, and b has similar impacts
on increasing the volatility of market tightness.
16and starting with an arbitrary mass of ￿rms, the model is simulated, quarterly series are calculated
using averages of weekly series and the quarterly series are HP ￿ltered with a smoothing parameter
of 1600 in an identical manner to the empirical data. The vector of simulation moments ￿s(￿)
(which includes the same business cycle moments as in ￿d) is an average over 50 simulations each
500 quarters in length. The estimate of ￿ minimizes the weighted distance between the actual and











where W is a positive de￿nite weighting matrix.
For the weighing matrix, I chose to perfectly match the volatility and autocorrelation of average
labor productivity. This follows the spirit of previous exercises in the literature, which is to show
whether it is possible to match the volatilities of market tightness and unemployment within the
standard search and matching model given the low volatility of average labor productivity in the
data. The search and matching model creates a low autocorrelation of vacancies relative to the
data which might also a⁄ect correlations to some degree. To minimize that problem, I put a higher
weight on volatility statistics than autocorrelation and correlation statistics. In all experiments,
the weighting matrix used is identical.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Standard Model
For comparison purposes, I ￿rst present the results of an economy with only aggregate (disembod-
ied) shocks. The results are displayed in Tables 4-5. The volatility and autocorrelation of the shocks
are pinned down only by autocorrelation and volatility of average labor productivity (because a very
high weight is put on these moments). In the simulation results, volatilities of vacancies and unem-
ployment are around one-fourth of the data. These volatilities are higher than the ones found by
Shimer (2005a), because there is capital in my model, and the ￿ ow unemployment utility chosen (as
a share of labor income) is higher. Both of these factors increase the response of pro￿ts/vacancies
to productivity shocks.
The model generates nearly full correlation of 0.988 between the market tightness and average
labor productivity, while in the data, the correlation is much lower at 0.393. As I mentioned in
the previous section, a third problem is that the autocorrelation of vacancies is lower in the model
than the data, and this problem will persist in the augmented setting also.
4.3.2 Model With Embodied Technology Shocks
Role of Embodied Technology Shocks:
17The results of the stationary model with both embodied and disembodied technology shocks
are presented in Tables 6-7. The estimated conditional and unconditional volatility of embodied
shocks are a bit higher than that of disembodied shocks. The correlation between the two shocks
is low at 0.11. The volatilities from the model with embodied technology shocks ￿t the data much
better than does the exercise with only aggregate shocks. Volatilities of vacancies, unemployment
and market tightness have increased to the level of the data. In addition, because the correlation
between embodied and disembodied shocks is low, the correlation of market tightness with labor
productivity approaches that observed in the data.
In Table 8, I feed in the estimated parameters for embodied and disembodied shocks separately
to decompose the e⁄ect of the shocks. The second row feeds in only the embodied technology shocks
(normalizing disembodied productivity to one), and the third row feeds in only the disembodied
shocks (normalizing embodied productivity to one for all matches). Embodied technology shocks
on their own have very little impact on average labor productivity, while they explain almost all
of the ￿ uctuations in unemployment and vacancies. The pro￿ts and market tightness are much
more sensitive to embodied technology shocks because when embodied technology shock is higher
than the trend, given that there is mean reversion in the shocks, the ￿rm has a strong incentive to
post a vacancy and embody that technology in the new job.10 Embodied technology shocks have
little impact on average labor productivity because they a⁄ect only the new cohort of matches, and
new employment constitutes only a small portion of total employment. The fact that a big portion
of employed workers do not change productivity from one period to the next also implies that
the autocorrelation of average labor productivity is high. The third row shows that disembodied
technology shocks explain a much bigger portion of the volatility of average labor productivity but
explain only a quarter of the movements in unemployment and vacancies.
Role of speci￿c capital, CE:
With the inclusion of embodied technology shocks, the correlation between unemployment and
vacancies increases slightly relative to the model with only disembodied shocks, but there is still a
strong negative correlation. The correlation stays strong due to the cost of exit CE, which is set at
7 weeks of output. In Table 9, I give the results of an exercise where I decrease the cost of exit CE
to 3.5 (in the exercise CK is adjusted to keep the total cost of capital at 35%). In this case, the
volatility of vacancies is higher and the correlation between unemployment and vacancies is weaker
at -0.240. The two paragraphs below explain the mechanism for these e⁄ects.
10With mean reversion in embodied technology shocks, there might be cases where next period￿ s embodied tech-
nology shock is lower than current period￿ s shock. Note however that, because these shocks are deviations from
trend, occurence of these cases is not frequent. It is also possible to conceptualize the embodied technology shocks
as resulting from changing capital intensities in di⁄erent cohorts of entrants due to changing price of capital at the
time of entry in which case a higher price of capital would lead to lower capital intensity. In addition, impediments
like technological secrecy, patents, and captured consumers, may make it cosly to replicate existing technologies.
18Decreasing CE increases the correlation between unemployment and vacancies. The mechanism
is best explained using a positive embodied technology shock for the new entrants. When there is a
positive shock to the new entrants, the outside value of employed workers increases since they have
the option to terminate the current match to be employed in the productive new vintage. In addi-
tion, with a positive shock more vacancies are posted per unemployed worker making the duration
of unemployment shorter, further increasing the outside value of employed workers. As the outside
value of employed workers increases, more workers will terminate their current match to go into
the unemployment pool to be reemployed in the new vintage. If the cost of terminating the match
is low, then a positive shock results in an increase in unemployment (due to the termination of low
of productivity jobs), and also an increase in vacancies per unemployed worker, since productivity
is higher. This leads to a higher correlation of unemployment and vacancies relative to the case of
high termination cost. In that respect, CE is important to preserve the strong negative correlation
between unemployment and vacancies observed in the data.
In addition, when CE decreases, the volatility of vacancies increases. In response to a positive
embodied technology shock market tightness increases (as expected pro￿ts increase), and at the
same time, with a lower cost of exit, unemployment increases because of endogenous separations.
Since vacancies are equal to the multiplication of market tightness with unemployment, the response
of vacancies will be stronger when there are more endogenous separations making vacancies more
volatile.
One clari￿cation is that increasing CE a⁄ects the results only when there are endogenous termi-
nation of matches, that is, increasing CE decreases the endogenous termination of matches, which
impacts other moments also. Once endogenous terminations approach zero, increasing the termi-
nation cost is neutral for the results. This is because I decrease CK proportionately when I increase
CE, so that the total cost of capital is the same in all exercises. Otherwise, as mentioned in the
calibration section, the increasing cost of CE leaves less surplus to be shared between the ￿rm and
worker, and that increases the volatility of market tightness on its own. So neutralizing the e⁄ect
of CE by a proportionate change in CK works against me when trying to explain the volatilities
observed in market tightness and unemployment. Given the neutrality of CE above a threshold,
the choice of CE does not strictly come from a minimization problem of ￿(￿) (Eq(21)). It is chosen
high enough such that there is almost no endogenous termination of matches and increasing it
further does not a⁄ect the simulation results.
It is also useful to compare the CE used in the simulations with the estimates of speci￿c human
and physical capital in the literature. The cost of displacement includes the loss of accumulated
job/industry/occupation speci￿c human capital, the training cost of the new worker, and the phys-
ical capital possibly being discarded, relocated, or staying idle until a new worker is found.
With respect to speci￿c human capital, Jacobson et al. (1993), Kambourov and Manovs kii
19(2007), and Topel (1991) ￿nd that workers who were displaced in the preceding 5 years su⁄er
around a 15 to 25% reduction in their weekly earnings. In the case where the physical capital
is relocated to a new ￿rm, Ramey and Shapiro (2001) estimate that the average market value of
equipment is 28 cents per dollar of the replacement cost for the aerospace industry. The referred
studies imply a higher value of speci￿c capital than what I used in the quantitative exercise, but as
I explained above, increasing speci￿c capital above the value I used does not a⁄ect the simulation
results (while decreasing it does a⁄ect the results).
4.3.3 Model With Growth
The growth economy results are displayed in Tables 10-11. The results are very similar to the
case of the stationary economy. The biggest di⁄erence concerns the cost of exit CE: The cost of
exit found has now increased to 11 weeks of output. In the growth economy, a higher cost of
exit is needed to decrease endogenous separations to almost zero. With growth, there are two
di⁄erent forces at work that might cause matches to be endogenously terminated. One is that, as
in the stationary economy, a vintage of entrants might have low detrended productivity shocks.
The second is that as the vintage ages, productivity of the vintage relative to that of new entrants
decreases. Whatever the cost of exit is, old cohorts choose at some point to end the employment and
it is impossible to fully prevent endogenous terminations. What is important is that as vintages
age, their proportion in the population approaches zero because of exogenous terminations. If
the endogenous termination is late enough in their lifecycle, its e⁄ect on unemployment becomes
negligible. In this setting, a higher cost of exit is needed to decrease the endogenous termination
of matches to negligible levels.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I give a competing explanation for the source of ￿ uctuations in unemployment and
vacancies. A vintage model of embodied technology is attractive because it is consistent with the
micro-level evidence that ￿rm-level productivity is highly persistent and that around half of produc-
tivity growth happens through reallocation of workers across ￿rms, not by within ￿rm productivity
growth. Second, I do not need to resort to unreasonable parameterizations or non-standard wage
setting rules to get rigidity in wages to account for the volatilities in unemployment and vacancies.
Finally, the relatively low correlation of market tightness with average labor productivity in the
data suggests that there are signi￿cant sources of ￿ uctuations other than shocks to average labor
productivity, and cohort-speci￿c shocks might be one such source.
I ￿nd that with the addition of embodied technology shocks, the MP model is able to account
for the cyclical ￿ uctuations in unemployment and vacancies. The estimated volatility of embodied
20technology shocks is close to the volatility of disembodied technology shocks, but they explain
almost all of the ￿ uctuations in unemployment and vacancies. A necessary element in order for
the model to produce desirable results is the existence of some type of speci￿c human or physical
capital.
6 APPENDIX:
A1: Derivation of the surplus equation in the stationary economy
Equation (3) simpli￿es to:
￿(A;Z;z) =
zA ￿ CK ￿ w(A;Z;z) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)CE
+￿ (1 ￿ ￿)E
￿
1fz2￿(A0;Z0)g (￿ (A0;Z0;z) + (1 ￿ ￿)CE)
￿ (22)
Equation (6) simpli￿es to:


















+ ￿CE ￿ U
￿
A0;Z0￿￿￿
Equation (7) simpli￿es to:















For the part below this I use the Nash bargaining wage determination rule speci￿ed in Section
2.2.1.
Because ￿ = ￿, using equations (13) and (15), I get W ￿ U = ￿SB: Substituting this and
equation (9) into equation (24) I get:














Finally, substituting for E [maxfSB (A0;Z0;z0);0g] from the no pro￿t condition (17) unemploy-
ment equation simpli￿es to:








Plugging equations (22), (23) and (25) into the surplus equation (11), surplus is found to be:
S(A;Z;z) =
zA ￿ CK + (1 ￿ ￿)CE ￿ b ￿
￿(A;Z)￿CV
(1￿￿)




￿ (A0;Z0;z) + W (A0;Z0;z)
+CE ￿ U(A0;Z0)
!#
21Substituting S = ￿ + W ￿ U + CE for the term within the expectation term:
S(A;Z;z) =
zA ￿ CK + (1 ￿ ￿)CE ￿ b ￿
￿(A;Z)￿CV
(1￿￿)




Substituting equation (14) into the expectation term and substituting for CE using equation
(2), I get equation (18).
A2: The non-stationary equilibrium equations for the growth economy
This section gives the surplus equation of the growth economy before it is detrended. The
derivation of the equilibrium equations from more primitive conditions is very similar to the no-
growth economy.
I look for equilibria where ￿ depends on the aggregate state variables (A;Z): Set ￿ depends
on (A;Z): Set ￿ depends on (A;Z;￿;t); where ￿ is the period of entry for the match and t is the
current period, ￿ ￿ t. The surplus of the match depends on (A;Z;z;￿;t): The sets ￿(A;Z;￿;t)
and ￿(A;Z) are found by the conditions:
￿(A;Z;￿;t) = fz : S(A;Z;z;￿;t) ￿ 0g; ￿ ￿ t
￿(A;Z) = fz : S(A;Z;z;t;t) ￿ CE ￿ 0g
Although set ￿(A;Z) seems to depend on the current period t; t drops out when the variables
are detrended.
The surplus is found as:
S(A;Z;z;￿;t) =





+￿ (1 ￿ ￿)E maxfS(A0;Z0;z;￿;t + 1);0g
; ￿ ￿ t
In the surplus equation, the ￿ ow variables attached to the vintage (output zA and ￿ ow capital
cost CK) are multiplied by (1 + g)￿ where ￿ is the time of the creation of the match. Terms
b+ ￿CV
(1￿￿)￿(A;Z) are related to the unemployment utility of the worker and they are multiplied by
(1 + g)t. The reason is that the ￿ ow unemployment utility b and the value to the worker of new
matches grows with the current time t.
The surplus equation is detrended by dividing it by (1+g)t, that is b S(A;Z;z;d) = S(A;Z;z;￿;t)=(1+
g)t: The stationary b S depends only on (A;Z;z;d) where d is the time di⁄erence between current
time and the time the match was formed, d = t ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ t: The stationarized versions of the
equilibrium conditions are given in Section 3.2.
A3: The Computational Strategy
22To solve the model numerically, I use the discrete state space method. Each of the aggregate
shocks A and Z is discretized into 25 grids (resulting in 25 ￿ 25 aggregate states). I approximate
the shock process with a discrete Markov chain. For that purpose, I integrate the bivariate normal
distribution over each interval to compute the Markov transition matrix.
The solution algorithm for the stationary economy involves the following:
(i) Assume an initial ￿0 (A;Z)
(ii) Use ￿0 (A;Z) and an initial guess for S0(A;Z;z) to iterate over the surplus equation (18)
till it converges. (Sets ￿(A;Z) and ￿(A;Z) are also found in this step.)
(iii) Using the no pro￿t condition (17), I can update ￿1 (A;Z). Using ￿1 (A;Z); repeat steps (i)
and (ii) until
￿
￿￿i+1 (A;Z) ￿ ￿i (A;Z)
￿
￿ < ￿ where i is the number of iterations and ￿ is a very small
number.
For the growth economy, the strategy is the same except for the second step of iterating the
surplus equation. In the growth economy, ￿nding the surplus value S(A;Z;z;d) for all d 2 N
is an impossible task. Instead, I use the fact that in the growth economy any match￿ s surplus
becomes negative as it ages and it is eventually terminated. I set dmax high enough such that all
matches are terminated before that age, and use backward induction to solve for the value functions.
Speci￿cally, I set S(A;Z;z;dmax) = 0; then solve for S(A;Z;z;dmax ￿ 1) using equation (19) and
continue iterating backwards till d = 0: After S(A;Z;z;0) is found, ￿i (A;Z) can be updated from
the no pro￿t condition (Eq(18)). As before, I continue iterating until
￿
￿￿i+1 (A;Z) ￿ ￿i (A;Z)
￿
￿ < ￿:
23Table 1: Summary statistics, quarterly US data, 1951:1 to 2004:4
u v v=u p
Standard Deviation 0.125 0.139 0.259 0.013
Quarterly Autocorrelation 0.870 0.904 0.896 0.765
u 1 -0.919 -0.977 -0.302
Correlation Matrix v - 1 0.982 0.460
v=u - - 1 0.393
p - - - 1
Notes: The table is from Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007). Seasonally adjusted unemployment
data, u, is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The seasonally adjusted help-wanted advertising
index, v, is from the Conference Board. Both u and v are quarterly averages of monthly series.
Average labor productivity p is seasonally adjusted real average output per person in the non-farm
business sector, from the BLS. All variables are in logs as deviations from HP trend with smoothing
parameter 1600.
24Calibrated Parameter Values
Table 2: Shared parameters
Parameter De￿nition Value
￿ discount rate 0.991=12
b value of non-market activity 0.45
l matching parameter 0.3995
￿ workers￿bargaining power 0.4546
￿ separation rate 0.0081
b value of non-market activity 0.45
Table 3: Parameters Speci￿c to the Economy
Parameter De￿nition Aggregate Stationary Growth
CV cost of posting vacancy 0.22 0.56 0.33
CK ￿ ow cost of capital 0.35 0.27 0.22
1 + g growth rate - - 1.011=48
Notes: Di⁄erent speci￿cations are: economy with only aggregate shocks (Aggregate), stationary
economy with both aggregate and embodied technology shocks (Stationary), growth economy with
both aggregate and embodied technology shocks (Growth):
25Results for the economy with only aggregate shocks






CE (weekly output) 0
Table 5: Simulations results with the estimated parameters
u v v=u p
Standard Deviation 0.033 0.038 0.068 0.013
Quarterly Autocorrelation 0.832 0.631 0.769 0.769
u 1 -0.789 -0.937 -0.935
Correlation Matrix v - 1 0.954 0.952
v=u - - 1 0.998
p - - - 1
Notes: All variables are in logs as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 1600.
26Results for the stationary economy with aggregate shocks and embodied technology shocks






CE (weekly output) 7.0
Table 7: Simulation results with the estimated parameters
u v v=u p
Standard Deviation 0.118 0.144 0.243 0.013
Quarterly Autocorrelation 0.805 0.535 0.717 0.766
u 1 -0.714 -0.909 -0.414
Correlation Matrix v - 1 0.940 0.307
v=u - - 1 0.383
p - - - 1
Table 8: Decomposing the E⁄ect of Shocks
u v v=u p corr(u;v)
Data 0.125 0.139 0.259 0.013 -0.919
Embodied 0.107 0.131 0.221 0.004 -0.718
Disembodied 0.027 0.032 0.056 0.012 -0.781
Total 0.118 0.144 0.243 0.013 -0.714
27Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis with respect to CE
u v v=u p
Standard Deviation 0.119 0.174 0.231 0.013
Quarterly Autocorrelation 0.632 0.539 0.723 0.772
u 1 -0.240 -0.692 -0.387
Correlation Matrix v - 1 0.865 0.282
v=u - - 1 0.411
p - - - 1
Notes: The results are for the stationary economy with aggregate shocks and embodied technol-
ogy shocks, where the cost of exit is reduced to CE = 3:5: CK is adjusted to keep total capital cost
at 35%. For the rest of the parameters, the calibration and estimation results for the stationary
economy with both aggregate and embodied technology shocks are used
28Results for the growth economy with aggregate shocks and embodied technology shocks
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Table 10: Simulations results with the estimated parameters
u v v=u p
Standard Deviation 0.118 0.144 0.243 0.013
Quarterly Autocorrelation 0.814 0.545 0.727 0.765
u 1 -0.712 -0.909 -0.420
Correlation Matrix v - 1 0.940 0.306
v=u - - 1 0.386
p - - - 1
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